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Abstract 
Computer offences and crimes against corporate computer systems have increasingly become a major 
challenge to information security management in the Internet-enabled global economy and society. In 
this study, we attempt to develop a theoretical model that integrates three main stream criminology 
theories, i.e., general deterrence, rational choice, and individual propensity. We submit that, while the 
main decision process leading to an offensive act may be explained by the rational choice theory, self-
control and deterrence factors could significantly alter the risk-benefit calculus assumed in the 
rational choice model. Using data collected from employees in multiple organizations, we tested our 
model using structural equation modelling techniques. We found that the perceived benefits of 
offensive acts dominate the rational calculus in individuals, and that the low self-control significantly 
impacts the perceived benefits and risks, thus playing a major role in the computer offences 
perpetrated by individuals in organizational settings. In addition, we found that deterrence only has 
limited impact on the offensive intentions through increased perceived risks. By integrating multiple 
theories into one seamless model, we hope to provide better understanding of computer offences and 
deeper insights for improving information security management practices. 
 
Keywords: Information Security, Criminology, Individual Behavior, Computer Crimes, Computer 
Offences. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Managing information security in organizations is to a large degree managing human behavior in the 
organizations. In a recent survey of IT mangers of global companies, 60% of the respondents said that 
employee misconducts involving information systems is a top concern about information security, 
second only to major viruses, Trojan horse, and Internet worms, (Ernst & Young, 2008). 
Understanding why employees commit misconducts or even criminal acts against organizational IT 
systems is the most important first step towards effective information security management. To this 
end, the majority of the information security literature has been devoted to the human behavior aspect 
of information security based on various theoretical lenses. Since computer offences and employee 
misconducts against information systems are closely related to criminal behavior, IS scholars have 
naturally been attracted to the literature of criminology. For example, general deterrence theory (GDT) 
has been used by Straub (1990), Straub and Welke (1998), and D’Arcy et al. (2009) as the foundation 
to understand employee misconducts in organizations. Similarly, Willison (2006) and Willison and 
Backhouse (2006) have developed frameworks based on rational choice and situational crime 
prevention perspectives for  understanding computer crimes and employee misconducts and 
developing preventive measures and systems in organizational settings.  On the other hand, from the 
behavioral modification perspective, Dinev and Hu (2007) have proposed an individual security 
behavior model based on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 2002) for understanding employee 
security behavior and developing organizational and national policies for effective information 
security management.  
These models and theories differ significantly in terms of perspectives and prescriptions. In addition 
to the possibility that they could potentially complement each other in providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of human behavior in organizational information security settings, we 
also recognize that there is at least one significant gap in the behavioral research of information 
security: the role of the stable individual traits has been missing from these models and frameworks, 
that is, the individual propensity towards committing criminal or offensive acts. The individual 
propensity theory, also known as social control theory, originated from the seminal work of 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) about a general theory of crime. This theory posits that individual 
difference (or propensity) predisposes an individual to criminal behavior. However, one critical 
question that remains is how the individual propensity interacts with other known factors in 
criminology, such as deterrence, rational choice, crime situation, and other individual and 
organizational factors commonly identified in the organizational information security literature.  
In this study, we set out to extend the current research on the behavioral aspects of information 
security and attempt to accomplish the following three objectives: 1) integrate multiple theories to 
develop a theoretical model about computer offensive behavior in corporate settings, 2) test the 
relationships among rational choice, deterrence, individual propensity, and computer offensive 
outcome of individuals, and 3) provide prescriptive guidance to information security management 
based on the results from the empirical testing of the theoretical model. Corporate computer offences 
and computer crimes vary widely in motives, forms, targets, and consequences. In this study, we 
focus on internal computer offence defined as any act by an employee using computers that is against 
the established rules and policies of an organization. By this definition, computer offences include but 
are not limited to unauthorized access to data and systems, unauthorized copying or transferring of 
confidential data, or selling confidential data to third party for personal gains, etc.   
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. We first review the relevant literature and provide a brief 
description of each of the theories used in the study. This is followed by presenting our integrated 
research model from which we developed our research hypotheses. We then proceed to discussing the 
research design and methodology. Finally, we present the results of the empirical testing of the model 
and discuss the contributions of this study and the potential implications for theory and practice. 
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2 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The significant role of human agents in organizational information security has long been recognized 
by scholars, along with the effort in developing and deploying more advanced protective technologies 
and establishing and enforcing effective security policies and procedures. Early studies of information 
security by IS scholars were largely based on surveys of managers and employees in organizations 
using ad hoc theoretical or empirical frameworks (e.g., Goodhue and Straub 1991; Loch et al. 1992). 
Recently IS scholars started to use more established theories in their analyses of the information 
security issues (e.g., Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Dinev and Hu 2007; Boss et al., 2009, D’Arcy et al. 
2009). Given the similarity between computer offences and misconducts in organizational settings and 
criminal behavior in social settings, the theories developed in the criminology literature have been 
adopted as the mainstream foundations for information security research, including but not limited to 
general deterrence theory, rational choice theory, and social control theory. Willison and Backhouse 
(2006) provided a detailed discussion on many of these theoretical perspectives.  
The existence of a large number of theories, each taking a different perspective on criminal behavior, 
creates opportunities for developing integrated models and theories. However, how exactly these 
theories should be integrated into one integrated criminal behavior model is far from clear. Piquero 
and Tibbetts (2002) proposed a model in which the effects of individual propensity variables (prior 
offending, moral beliefs, and low self-control) on the criminal behavior intention are mediated by the 
rational choice variables (perceived benefits, perceived cost, and situational shame). On the other 
hand, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found that when the moral inhibitions were high, an 
individual’s consideration of costs and benefits of corporate crime were virtually superfluous; when 
the moral inhibitions were weak, however, the individual was more likely to be deterred by threats of 
formal and informal sanctions and by the organizational context.  
The literature reviews of both criminology and information security studies lead us to propose a 
research model that has the rational choice at its core and other theoretical frameworks at its 
peripheral to form a nomological network of computer offensive behavior. We submit that when an 
opportunity to commit a computer crime exists, whether or not an individual commits the crime 
depends on the rational calculus of costs and benefits of the intended act by the individual. However, 
the mechanisms of the cost-benefit calculus are affected by two independent forces: one internal and 
one external to the individual. The internal force is the individual propensity, defined as the degree of 
low self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). The external force is the general deterrence related to 
committing the offensive act, defined as the perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of sanction 
against the behavior (Gibbs 1975). We argue that low self-control and deterreance are antecedents of 
the rational choice calculus. This is because we believe that these internal and external factors are 
more likely to change how the benefits and risks are assessed by the individual rather than how much 
the individual weighs the benefits or risks in the decision calculus. In the sections that follow, we 
develop this model and its hypotheses based on the extant literature via a deductive process. 
2.1 Rational Choice Theory of Criminal Behavior 
The rational choice theory of criminal behavior argues that the decision to engage in criminal 
behavior by an individual is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of the crime relative to the 
perceived costs and benefits associated with non-crime (Becker 1968; Cornish and Clarke 1986; 
Paternoster and Simpson 1996). Although this theory has been criticized by some criminologists 
(Akers 1990), studies have found strong empirical evidence that supports the basic arguments of the 
theory. For example, Nagin and Paternoster (1993) investigated the criminal behavior (theft, drinking 
and driving, and sexual assault) using college students and found that conditions pertaining to rational 
choices must be included in the model in order to account for the amount of variances in observed 
criminal behavior.  
In this study, we submit that computer offence is a type of deviant behavior which has more or less 
similar incentives and consequences as other types of deviant behavior such as crimes. Like crimes, 
committing computer offences generate extrinsic benefits (money, material) and intrinsic benefits 
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(thrill, happiness), and formal risks (legal and monetary sanctions) and informal risks (loss of respect, 
loss of support) (Buchman et al. 1992) simultaneously to the perpetrator. Therefore, the rational 
choice arguments of criminology can be naturally extended to explain the decisions pertaining to the 
computer offences. Thus, we propose:     
H1a: The higher an individual’s perceived extrinsic benefits from the offensive act, the stronger his or 
her intention to commit the computer offense. 
H1b: The higher an individual’s perceived intrinsic benefits from the offensive act, the stronger his or 
her intention to commit the computer offense. 
H1c: The higher an individual’s perceived risk of formal sanction against the offensive act, the 
weaker his or her intention to commit the computer offense. 
H1d: The higher an individual’s perceived risk of informal sanction against to the offensive act, the 
weaker his or her intention to commit the computer offense. 
2.2 Self-Control Theory of Criminal Behavior 
The self-control theory originated from the seminal work of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) in an 
attempt to develop a general theory of crime. They argued that all human beings have the same 
potential of committing crimes given the right circumstances. However, not everyone becomes a 
criminal and the reason is the individual differences in self-control – propensity to refrain from 
committing criminal acts under any circumstance. This propensity is said to be established early and 
remains relatively stable throughout an individual’s life (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Criminal 
behavior is likely to occur when individuals with low self-control are presented with opportunities for 
committing crimes.  
The self-control theory and the rational choice theory are built on the same basic assumption, that 
human beings are rational in their decision making processes. This makes the integration of the two 
frameworks logical. It can be argued that the two theories are looking into criminal behavior from 
different perspectives: the stable personal characteristics vs. the dynamic calculus process. We argue 
that personal characteristics such as low self-control affect an individual’s ability to evaluate the 
benefits and risks in a systematic manner. The immediate gratification and thrill seeking are the trade-
mark characteristics of low self-control, which will likely result in overestimating the benefits of the 
criminal act, and underestimating the potential risks. Thus, we propose that: 
H2a: The lower an individual’s self-control, the higher the perceived extrinsic benefits of the 
computer offense.  
H2b: The lower an individual’s self-control, the higher the perceived intrinsic benefits of the 
computer offense. 
H2c: The lower an individual’s self-control, the lower the perceived risks of informal sanctions 
against the computer offense.  
H2d: The lower an individual’s self-control, the lower the perceived risks of formal sanctions against 
the computer offense. 
2.3 General Deterrence Theory of Criminal Behavior 
Human society has long recognized the role of deterrence in preventing criminal behavior. In fact, the 
foundation of the modern justice system in most civilized societies is largely based on the utilitarian 
philosophy behind the deterrence theory of crime (Akers 1999, p. 15). The general deterrence theory 
(Gibbs 1975) argues that an individual is less likely to commit criminal acts if the perceived certainty, 
severity, and celerity of the sanctions against the acts are greater. Subsequent research in criminology 
and social studies has established general support for this framework (e.g., Tittle 1980; Nagin and 
Pogarsky 2001). Deterrence theory is also the first criminology framework to be used by IS scholars 
for studying information security issues (e.g. Straub 1990; Staub and Nance 1990; D’Arcy et al. 2009). 
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Similar to self-control theory, general deterrence theory is also built on the same assumption of 
human rationality, which makes it logical to consider integration with the other two frameworks. In 
this study, we argue that the effect of the deterrence on criminal behavior may not be direct, as often 
hypothesized in prior literature. Instead, in the overall framework of rational choice theory, the role of 
deterrence is more likely in increasing the perceived risks and decreasing the perceived benefits of the 
intended criminal act, which in turn reduce the intention to commit the crime. This logic should apply 
to computer offences as well. Hence:    
H3a: The stronger the perceived deterrence, the lower the perceived extrinsic benefits of the computer 
offence. 
H3b: The stronger the perceived deterrence, the higher the perceived intrinsic benefits of the 
computer offence.  
H3c: The stronger the perceived deterrence, the higher the perceived risks of informal sanction 
against the computer offence. 
H3d: The stronger the perceived deterrence, the higher the perceived risks of formal sanction against 
the computer offence.  
2.4 An Integrated Theory of Criminal Behavior 
The research hypotheses developed in the above sections can be summarized in one integrated model 
of computer offensive behavior, as shown in Figure 1. In addition to the constructs and relationships 
discussed, this model also includes two control variables: age and computer use. Age is included 
because it is commonly used in criminological and information security studies as a control variable. 
We included computer use, measured as the average hours of using computers by an employee to 
control for the effect of difference level of access to computer systems and user computer skills.  
 
Figure 1: Research Model 
(LSC-low self control, DET-deterrence, PEB-perceived extrinsic benefits, PIB-perceived intrinsic benefits, PIR-perceived 
informal risks, PFR-perceived formal risks, INT-intention to commit computer offence) 
In the following sections, we discuss how this theoretical model is tested using data collected from 
individuals in different organizations and present the analysis of the results using structural equation 
modelling techniques.   
3 DATA AND METHOD 
3.1 Research Design 
This study adopted a scenario based survey strategy to collect data from employees in organizations 
who may or may not have committed offensive acts towards corporate computers and systems. The 
questionnaires were distributed to employees in multiple organizations where each randomly selected 
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employee will be asked to assess his or her intention to commit the offensive acts described in the 
three scenarios with varying levels of severity of offence.  
Using scenarios to elicit individual responses has been a common technique in criminology research 
(e.g., Batchman et al. 1992; Paternoster and Simpson 1996; Piquero and Tibbetts 1996), and it has 
been increasingly used by IS scholars in information security research (e.g., Harrington 1996; Moores 
and Chang 2006, and D’Arcy et al. 2009). Due to the secrecy associated with criminal or illicit 
behavior, it is natural that individuals will be unwilling or uncomfortable to report their own actions 
related to computer offences or crimes, not to mention knowing their peers’ offensive activities. 
Therefore, the questionnaires commonly used in information security research that rely on self-
reporting of illicit or criminal behavior might not be reliable. In criminological research, faced with 
the same difficulty, scholars have often resorted to the use of scenarios of criminal activities to elicit 
input from survey subjects. Since these scenarios describe fictitious situations and the respondents are 
asked what they “could” or “would” do under the same or similar situations, rather then what they 
“did” or “have done”, the pressure to tell lies is less, thus more reliable responses are more likely.  
3.2 Operationalization of Constructs 
Intention to offend (INT). Intention to offend is measured as a reflective construct in different 
scenarios by asking the respondent “how likely,” and “how willing” the respondent would do what the 
factious character did in the specific scenarios. This is different from the commonly used approach in 
the literature (e.g., Piquero and Tibbetts 1996) where only one question is used for the likelihood the 
subject would perform the behavior described in the scenarios. We use two items with slight 
variations to increase the reliability of the measurement. This measure is repeated for the three 
scenarios, resulting in a total of six items for the construct.   
Low self-control (LSC). Grasmick et al. (1993) operationalized low self-control into six components: 
impulsivity, preference to simple tasks, risk seeking, preference to physical activity, self-centered, and 
volatile temper. In order to control the length of the measurement instrument based on the 
characteristics of the focal offending behavior (computer offense), for this study we adopted three of 
these components – impulsivity, risk seeking, and self-centered with their associated measures. 
Perceived extrinsic benefits (PEB).  This construct is modelled as a reflective construct primarily 
focusing on the perceived material benefits by the individual who commits the offending behavior. 
The items were constructed partially based on the items in Paternoster and Simpson (1993).  
Perceived intrinsic benefits (PIB).  This construct is modelled as a reflective construct primarily 
focusing on the perceived pleasure and fun by the individual who commits the offending behavior. 
The items were constructed partially based on the items in Paternoster and Simpson (1993).  
Perceived risk of formal sanction (PFR).  This construct is modelled as a reflective construct 
primarily focusing on the perceived risk of two formal sanctions - lose of job and legal actions - by 
the individual who commits the offending act. Risk is measured by the product of the probability and 
the severity of the sanction. The measurement is modelled after Buchman et al. (1992).  
Perceived risk of informal sanction (PIR).  This construct is modelled as a reflective construct 
primarily focusing on the perceived risk of two informal sanctions – loss of respect from family and 
relatives and loss of respect from friends and colleagues - by the individual who commits the 
offending behavior. Risk is measured by the product of the probability and the severity of the 
sanction. The measurement is modelled after Buchman et al. (1992).  
Deterrence (DET). In criminological literature, the construct of deterrence is often operationalized 
into three first order constructs: certainty of sanction, severity of sanction, and celerity of sanction 
(Gibbs 1975; Antia et al. 2006). Each of the first order constructs was measured using three reflective 
items. However, to simplify the model and gain theoretical parsimony, we constructed the deterrence 
construct as a reflective second order construct with all nine items from the first-order constructs. One 
item was later removed from the model due to low item loading.     
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3.3 Survey Development and Data Collection 
The measurement items for each construct in the model are based on a 7-point Likert scale. All of the 
items were adapted from the extant literature in order to maximize the validity and reliability of the 
measurement model. Three carefully designed computer offence scenarios are presented to each 
respondent at the beginning of the survey to elicit their assessment of intention to do the same as the 
actor did in each of the scenarios. The offensive scenarios include unauthorized access to payroll data, 
unauthorized access and transfer of product design, and stealing and selling price and cost data to 
competitors.   
The instrument was first drafted in English, and then translated into Chinese by the authors who are 
proficient in both languages. The Chinese version was then translated back into English by the authors 
to check for inaccuracies. Numerous changes were made to the original versions until the authors all 
agreed that the items accurately reflect the intention of the measurement.  The survey instrument was 
then pilot tested using EMBA students enrolled in a top Chinese university in Shanghai. A total of 31 
valid responses were received, along with oral comments from the students. The data were used to run 
an array of diagnostic tests. A number of modifications were made to the instrument based on the 
feedback from the students and the statistical characteristics of the data.  
The final survey was distributed to employees in five organizations in China. These organizations 
were selected largely due to their willingness to cooperate with this research after the authors 
contacted a number of organizations. Primarily due to the strong support of the managers in these five 
organizations, the response rate of the survey is nearly 100% from the 50 randomly selected 
employees in each organization. In the end, 227 surveys were received, and 207 were deemed as 
complete and usable. The demographic profile of the respondents is described in Table 2.  
 
Category Measures Frequency Percentage (%) 
Age < 24 
25 – 34 
35-44 
44-55 
> 55 
45 
119 
29 
10 
3 
21.74 
57.49 
14.01 
4.83 
1.45 
Sex Male 
Female 
119 
87 
57.47 
42.03 
Education High school 
Professional School 
Undergraduate 
Graduate 
Doctoral 
2 
55 
101 
44 
3 
0.97 
26.57 
48.79 
21.26 
1.45 
Job Title Manager 
Supervisor 
Team leader 
Director 
Employee 
Other 
12 
19 
8 
2 
156 
9 
5.80 
9.18 
3.87 
0.97 
75.36 
4.35 
Job Type Administrative 
Operational 
Technical 
Professional staff 
Other 
35 
53 
45 
27 
44 
16.91 
25.60 
21.74 
13.04 
21.26 
Table 2: Demographic Profile of Respondents 
4 RESULTS 
To analyze the measurement quality as well as the path model for hypothesis testing, we used 
SmartPLS (Ringle et al. 2005) as the primary statistical tool. Following the widely adopted two-step 
approach to structural equation modelling (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Hulland 1999), we first 
assessed the quality of the measurement model to ensure the validity of constructs and reliability of 
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the measurements. This is followed by structural modelling to test the research hypothesis and the 
overall quality of the proposed model.    
4.1 Quality of Measurement Model 
Assessment of the measurement model’s quality is the critical first step toward structural equation 
modelling analysis.  Ideally, the quality of the measurement model should be assessed using model fit 
indices such as χ2 provided by CFA analysis. However, due to the differences in underlying 
assumptions about data characteristics, component based SEM techniques such SmartPLS does not 
provide the fit indices. On the other hand, it does provide a rich set of indicators about reliability and 
convergent and discriminant validity. Table 3 shows some of the quality indicators of our 
measurement model.     
 
Latent 
Construct 
No. of 
Items 
Item Loading (t-stats) AVE Composite 
reliability 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
DET  8 0.728(15.393),0.707(11.596),0.900(45.781),0.858(22.892), 
0.813(16.524),0.887(30.061),0.864(26.533),0.867(24.917) 
0.6922 0.9470  0.9353  
 INT  6 0.654(8.539),0.841(20.522),0.858(27.650),0.577(7.794), 
0.771(11.601),0.792(15.469) 
0.5825  0.8919  0.8527  
LSC  6 0.594(4.908),0.557(5.609),0.776(10.993),0.696(8.536), 
0.700(9.183),0.697(9.925) 
0.4611  0.8353  0.7635  
PEB  3 0.936(37.049),0.950(14.364),0.926(15.396) 0.8892  0.9601  0.9382  
PFR  2 0.866(24.716),0.920(56.575) 0.8016  0.8898  0.7553  
PIB 3 0.886(24.660),0.934(40.619),0.878(23.327) 0.8112  0.9279  0.8831  
PIR  2 0.931(60.292),0.916(38.164) 0.8529  0.9206  0.8279  
Table 3: Measurement Quality Indicators 
The quality of the measurement model is usually assessed in terms of its content validity, construct 
validity, and reliability (Hulland 1999; Straub et al. 2004). Content validity is defined as the degree to 
which the items represent the construct being measured. Content validity is usually assessed by the 
domain experts and literature review (Straub et al. 2004). In this case the content validity is primarily 
assured by adopting the previously published measurement items for the construct and an item by 
item review by the research team.   
Construct validity can be assessed using convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent 
validity is defined as the degree to which the measurement items are related to the construct they are 
theoretically predicted to be related. Convergent validity is shown when the t-values of the outer 
model loadings are statistically significant. As it can be seen from Table 3, all item loadings for each 
construct are significant at p <0.01 (t > 2.576), indicating good convergent validity. Hulland (1999) 
recommends that items with loading below 0.5 should be dropped. All item loadings in our 
measurement model are greater than this threshold.  Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which 
measures of the different model constructs are unique. There are a number of techniques that have 
been used to for testing discriminant validity in the literature (Straub et al. 2004). In this study we 
assess the discriminant validity by comparing the correlations between constructs and the AVE of 
each construct. This is a widely used technique in the IS literature when component based SEM 
methods such as PLS is used. Discriminant validity is supported if the square root of construct AVE is 
greater than the correlations of the construct with all other constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981; 
Hulland 1999). In our case, the diagonal values in Table 4 are AVEs of constructs, which show good 
discriminant validity for all constructs in the measurement model.      
 
 DET   INT  LSC  PEB  PFR  PIB  PIR  
DET 0.6922       
INT -0.2127 0.5825      
LSC -0.1293 0.4656 0.4611     
PEB -0.1295 0.2409 0.1441 0.8892    
PFR 0.3668 -0.3279 -0.2974 -0.088 0.8016   
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PIB -0.1522 0.4732 0.4392 0.2096 -0.372 0.8112  
PIR 0.3112 -0.4195 -0.3233 -0.0853 0.5838 -0.3151 0.8529 
Table 4: Latent Variable Correlations (values on the diagonal are AVEs) 
The reliability of the measurement addresses the concern of how well the items for one construct 
correlate or move together (Straub et al. 2004). Reliability is usually assessed by two indicators –
Cronbach’s apha and composite reliability. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of the internal consistency 
among all items used for one construct. Composite reliability addresses similar concept but is 
considered as a more rigorous reliability measure in the context of structural equation modelling 
(Raykov 1998; Chin 1998). The reliability indicators of the constructs in this study are shown in Table 
3. The lowest composite reliability is .0.83 and the lowest Cronbach’s alpha is 0.75, higher than the 
recommended minimum value of 0.7 (Baggozzi and Yi 1988; Gefen et al. 2000), indicating 
acceptable reliability of the measurement for each constructs.  
4.2 Structural Analysis 
Component based PLS techniques do not provide overall model fit indices. The primary indicators for 
the quality of the structural model are the R2 values of the endogenous variables (Hulland 1999), 
which measure how much of the variances in the endogenous constructs are explained by the 
exogenous constructs specified in the model. Figure 2 presents the results of the structural analysis 
using SmartPLS.  
The R2 value for the dependent variable of Intention to Offend is 0.325, indicating that the variables in 
the model explained about 33% of the variance in the dependent variable, which, by the standard of 
structural equation modelling, is moderately high. The R2 values for the mediating constructs are in 
the reasonable range of 10%-20%, with the exception of PEB which has a low R2 of 0.035. This low 
value suggests that the hypothesized predicator, LSC, cannot explain the variances in PEB alone. 
Other factors may exist and need further investigation.  
 
 
Figure 2: Results of Structural Analysis (*** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1 significant levels) 
The most interesting results from this structural model are about the individual calculus that leads to 
the intention to commit offences against computer systems in organizational settings. The hypotheses 
related to the perceived benefits (H1a, β=0.140, p < 0.05 and H1b, β=0.346, p < 0.01) are supported 
or strongly supported, while the hypotheses related to the perceived risks H1c (β=-0.284, p < 0.01) 
and H1d (β=-0.028, p > 0.1) are mixed. This result reveals that when an individual is contemplating 
whether to commit offensive behavior toward the organizational computer systems, the perceived 
benefits dominate the perceived risks in the rational decision making process. The strongly significant 
path from PIB to INT suggests that the intrinsic satisfaction such as thrill and happiness that would be 
gained from the offensive act, are even more influential than the extrinsic material gains such as the 
possession of money and goods, on the behavioral choice of the individual.   
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Hypothesis 
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Path 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value Testing Result 
H1a PEB->INT 0.140 2.174 < 0.05 Supported  
H1b PIB->INT 0.346 4.307 < 0.01 Strongly supported  
H1c PIR->INT -0.284 3.654 < 0.01 Strongly supported 
H1d PFR->INT -0.028 0.286 > 0.1 Not supported 
H2a LSC->PEB 0.136 1.743 < 0.05 Supported  
H2b LSC->PIB 0.410 4.779 < 0.01 Strongly supported  
H2c LSC->PIR -0.296 3.847 < 0.01 Strongly supported 
H2d LSC->PFR -0.257 3.320 < 0.01 Strongly supported  
H3a DET->PEB -0.111 1.602 > 0.1 Not supported 
H3b DET->PIB -0.097 1.434 > 0.1 Not supported 
H3c DET->PIR 0.267 3.884 < 0.01 Strongly Supported  
H3d DET->PFR 0.331 4.515 < 0.01 Strongly supported  
Table 5: Latent Variable Correlations 
Perhaps even more interesting is the insignificance of the hypotheses related to deterrence. Our data 
show that deterrence impacts individual intention to commit computer offences primarily through 
increasing the perceived informal risks by the individual. While deterrence, which is modelled as a 
second order reflective construct of certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment for computer 
offences in organizations, significantly impacts the perceived informal risks (H3c, β=0.267, p<0.01) 
and perceived formal risks (H3d, β=0.331, p < 0.01), only the perceived informal risks has a 
significantly negative influences on the individual’s intention to commit computer offenses.   
Last but not the least, the role of low self-control in explaining deviant behavior has once again been 
confirmed in the context of computer offence. The causal chain from self-control to offensive 
behavior is explained by our research model and confirmed by the data. Individuals with low self-
control are more likely to be tempted by the appeal of the offensive act in terms of perceived benefits 
of the act, and thus more likely to commit the act. This is because low self-control leads to higher 
levels of perceived extrinsic benefits (H2a, β=0.136, p<0.05) and perceived intrinsic benefits (H2b, 
β=0.410, p<0.01), and lower levels of perceived informal risks (H2c, β=-0.296, p<0.01) and formal 
risks (H2d, β=-0.257, p<0.01), which in turn strongly influence the intention to commit the abusive 
act (H1a and H1b). These results are summarized in Table 5. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Our structural equation modelling results using data collected from employees in five Chinese 
companies have provided strong support to our research model and hypotheses. Out of the 12 
hypothesized relationships, seven are strongly supported at the p<0.01 level, two are supported at the 
p <0.05 level, and the remaining three are not supported (p>0.1). These results have significant 
theoretical and practical implications for information security research and management. We now 
discuss some of these implications and potential future research directions.    
Our results suggest that computer offences by employees are primarily a result of overestimating the 
benefits and underestimating the risk by employees when the situations for committing the offences 
present themselves and the employees have the means to conduct the offensive acts. In their rational 
analyses about each scenario, perceived benefits seem to dominate perceived costs. This is consistent 
with the findings of Tunnell (1990) in a criminology study that criminal offenders primarily think 
about positive consequences and less about negative consequences. Furthermore, Akers (1999, p. 20) 
pointed out that the threat of sanctions only has limited marginal effect on criminal behavior, as 
evidenced by the weak link between capital punishment and the rate of homicides. The critical 
question to both criminology and information security is why it is so. This is certainly an important 
issue for future research.    
On the other hand, our results also suggest what might help lower the perceived benefits and increase 
the perceived risks of committing offensive acts and thus reduce computer offences in organizations. 
Our results show that employees with low self-control, those who are more concerned about 
themselves than others, who are more interesting in what happens now than in the future, and those 
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who are more risk taking than risk averse, are more likely to overestimate the benefits of offensive 
acts. In addition, our results show that deterrence can increase the perceived risks and thus reduce the 
intention to commit computer offences only to a limited degree. These findings imply that both 
psychological screening of employees and implementing strong security policies and rules can be 
effective in reducing internal computer crimes and offences. However, given the dominance of the 
perceived benefits in the offensive calculus, hiring employees with higher level of self-control and 
assigning them to sensitive positions seem to be more effective than enforcing strict punishments.     
6 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we developed and tested an integrated model of computer offences by employees in 
organizational settings based on multiple criminology theories. We found that the rational choice 
framework of computer offense is largely supported. However, the most interesting finding is that the 
perceived benefits of offensive acts dominate the perceived risks of the offensive acts in the rational 
calculus. As a result, the deterrence antecedents may be less effective than the self-control antecedents 
in the rational decision calculus of an individual.  
We must acknowledge that this study has a number of limitations. First and foremost, the research 
hypotheses are not yet well developed and the majority of the hypotheses are deducted directly from 
their base theories without substantial evidence from the literature. It is our intention to focus on the 
presentation of the ideas rather than seeking rigor in hypothesis development in this early stage of the 
study. Second, the literature review is still incomplete in many aspects. We intend to conduct a 
comprehensive literature search and review in the next stage of this research and address these 
limitations in future research.     
References 
Ajzen, I. (2002) Perceived behavioral control, self-efficacy, locus of control, and the theory of 
planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32, 665-683. 
Akers, R. (1999) Criminological Theories. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago, IL.  
Anderson, J.C., and Gerbing, S.W. (1988) Structural Equation Modeling in Practice: a Review and 
Recommended Two-Step Approach. Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 411-423. 
Antia, K.D., Bergen, M.E., Dutta, S., and Fisher, R.J. (2006) How Does Enforcement Deter Gray 
Market Incidence? Journal of Marketing, 70(1), 92-106. 
Bachman, R., Paternoster, R., and Ward, S. (1992) The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing a 
Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault. Law & Society Review, 26(2), 343-
372. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and Yi, Y. (1988) On the Evaluation of Structural Equation Models. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 16(1), 74-94. 
Becker, G. (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 
76(2), 169-217. 
Boss, S.R.,  Kirsch, L.J.,  Angermeier, I.,  Shingler, R.A., and Boss, R. W. (2009) If Someone is 
Watching, I'll Do What I'm Asked: Mandatoriness, Control, and Information Security. European 
Journal of Information Systems, 18, 151-164. 
Chin, W.W. (1998) The Partial Least Squares Approach to Structural Equation Modeling, in Modern 
Methods for Business Research, G.A. Marcoulides (ed.), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 
NJ. 295-336. 
Cornish, D. B. and Clarke, R. V. (1986) The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on 
Offending. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
D'Arcy, J., Havav, A., and Galletta, D. (2009) User Awareness of Security Countermeasures and Its 
Impact on Information Systems Misuse: A Deterrence Approach," Information Systems Research, 
20(1), 79-98.  
Dinev, T. and Hu, Q. (2007) The Centrality of Awareness in the Formation of User Behavioral 
Intentions towards Preventive Technologies in the Context of Voluntary Use. Journal of the 
Association for Information Systems, 8(7), 386-408. 
1388
Ernst & Young (2008) Global Information Security Survey. Ernst & Young, http://www.ey.com. 
Fornell, C. and Larcker, D.F. (1981) Evaluating Structural Equation Models with Unobservable 
Variables and Measurement Error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18, 39–50. 
Gefen, D., Straub, D.W., Boudreau, M.C. (2000) Structural Equation Modeling and Regression: 
Guidelines For Research Practice. Communications of AIS, 4, Article 7. 
Gettfredson, M. and Hirschi. T. (1990) A General Theory of Crime. Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, CA.  
Gibbs, J. P. (1975) Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence. Elsevier, New York, NY. 
Grasmick, H. G., and Bursik, R. (1990) Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: 
Extending the Deterrence Model. Law & Society Review. 24, 837-861. 
Grasmick, H., Tittle, G., Bursik Jr., R., and Arneklev, B. (1993) Testing the Core Implications of 
Gettfredson and Hirschi's General Theory of Crime. Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency, 30, 5-29. 
Harrington, S.J. (1996) The Effect of Codes of Ethics and Personal Denial of Responsibility on 
Computer Abuse Judgments and Intentions. MIS Quarterly, 20(3), 257-278 
Hulland, J. (1999) Use of Partial Least Squares (PLS) in Strategic Management Research: A Review 
of Four Recent Studies. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 195–204. 
Kankanhalli, A., Teo, H.H. ,Tan, B.C.Y., and Wei. K.K. (2003) An Integrative Study of Information 
Systems Security Effectiveness. International Journal of Information Management, 23(2), 139–
154. 
Nagin, D.S. and Paternoster, R. (1993) Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories 
of Crime. Law & Society Review, 27(3), 467-496. 
Paternoster, R and Simpson, S. (1993) A Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime, in R. V. Clarke 
& M. Felson, (eds.) Advances in Crimino logical Theory (v5): Routine Activity and Rational 
Choice, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ. 
Paternoster, R. and Simpson, S. (1996) Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational 
Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law & Society Review, 30(3) 549-583 
Paternoster, R., Saltzman, L.E., Waldo, G.P., and Chiricos, T.G. (1983) Perceived Risk and Social 
Control: Do Sanctions Really Deter? Law & Society Review, 17(3), 457-480 
Piquero, A. and Tibbetts, S. (1996) Specifying the direct and indirect effects of low self-control and 
situational factors in offenders' decision making: Toward a more complete model of rational 
offending. Justice Quarterly, 13(3), 481-510. 
Raykov, T. (1998) Coefficient Alpha and Composite Reliability with Interrelated Nonhomogeneous 
Items. Applied Psychological Measurement, 22 (4), 375-385 
Ringle, C.M., Wende, S., and Will, A. (2005) SmartPLS, 2.0 (beta), University of Hamburg, 
Hamburg, Germany, available on the Web at http://www.smartpls.de   
Straub, D. W. (1990) Effective IS Security: An Empirical Study. Information Systems Research, 1(3), 
255–276. 
Straub, D.W. and Nance, W.D. (1990) Discovering and Disciplining Computer Abuse in 
Organizations: A Field Study. MIS Quarterly, 14(1), 45–60. 
Straub, D.W. and Welke, R.J. (1998) Coping with Systems Risk: Security Planning Models for 
Management Decision Making. MIS Quarterly, 22(4), 441-469. 
Straub, D.W., Boudreau, M.C., and Gefen, D. (2004) Validation Guidelines for IS Positivist Research. 
Communications of the AIS, 13, 380-427. 
Simpson, S.S., Piquero, N.L., and Paternoster, R. (2002) Rationality and Corporate Offending 
Decisions, in A. R. Piquero and S. G. Tibbetts (Eds.) Rational Choice and Criminal Behavior – 
Recent Research and Future Challenges, Routledge, New York, NY.  25-39. 
Tittle, C.R. (1980) Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence. Praeger, New York. 
Tunnell, K. (1990) Choosing Crime: Close Your Eyes and Take Your Choices. Justice Quarterly, 
7(4), 673-690. 
Willison, R. (2006) Understanding the perpetration of employee computer crime in the organisational 
context. Information and Organization, 16, 304–324. 
Willison, R. and Backhouse, J. (2006) Opportunities for computer crime: considering systems risk 
from a criminological perspective. European Journal of Information Systems, 15, 403–414 
 
1389
